THE NATION

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THE BALANCE OF BLAME

Further Notes on the Strategic Causes of World War III

C. Wright Mills

HOW 'MODERN' IS REPUBLICANISM?

Robert G. Spivack

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LETTERS

New York's Primary

Dear Sirs: I think it only fair to tell you that many of us in the reform movement in New York Democratic politics feel strongly that "The Shame of New York," which you published on October 31, 1959, must get some of the credit for the important victories we scored in last week's primaries. Your admirable exposé of corruption in Tammany-ruled New York City shocked voters into realization of the need for reform.

I hope that more voters will read "The Shame of New York." The primary victories were gratifying — but there's an election still to come.

IRVING WOLFSON
Democratic District Leader
5th A.D. North
New York City

[*Copies of the 64-page special issue are still available at bulk rates: 10 for $4, 50 for $17.50, 100 for $30. Single copies, 50c. Order from* The Nation, *333 Sixth Ave., N.Y. 14, enclosing payment.*]

Encounter With Castro

Dear Sirs: I was, of course, quite interested in Barbara Deming's article on Cuba in *The Nation* of May 28.

Mrs. Matthews and I wondered whether the author realized that her accidental encounter with Fidel Castro was indirectly due to us. Fidel had come to our hotel, the Sevilla-Biltmore, to take us to lunch and then had driven us around, showing us some public works, and had just deposited us back at the hotel when Miss Deming and some equally lucky N.B.C. correspondents came up. We are happy that in the case of Miss Deming the results were so fruitful.

HERBERT L. MATTHEWS
Editorial Board, *The New York Times*

Contributions to Law

Dear Sirs: It has not, I think, been sufficiently noted that the Administration, and particularly Mr. Eisenhower, has made a number of signal contributions to jurisprudence. Three of the most important are: *the theory of presumptive immunity, the doctrine of projective gratuities* and *the principle of offensive secrecy*.

1. The theory of presumptive immunity was stated with brilliant succinctness by President Eisenhower. When confronted by charges that Sherman Adams had not lived up to the highest standards of his office, the President answered in just three words: "I need him." The relation of master and servant, employer and employee, offers knotty points of law. One of the most crucial is now clarified. A man is presumptively immune to dismissal and perhaps indictment if a superior claims that he is indispensable. This defense, it is to be noted, has a limited time span. With the discovery that a man is no longer indispensable, the immunity lapses and the original charges become relevant again.

2. The Administration has made it absolutely clear that it does not intend to tolerate the acceptance of gratuities by public servants, particularly from those who might expect favors in return. It was not explicitly stated whether or not the gratuities received are for present or later use. But Mr. Eisenhower has made the point clear by his practices. The ruling evidently applies only to gifts received for exclusive use in the present. Mr. Eisenhower's farm in Gettysburg, to which he is expected to retire, is stocked with gifts which will be used later. It is unfortunate that the doctrine of projective gratuities was not explicitly formulated. It would have helped those accused of payola and royola to have been able to plead that some of their gifts were intended to be used when they retired. . . . Still, if the reports are to be believed, they could retire now.

3. The principle of offensive secrecy has been invoked as a defense of Francis Powers' flight over Russia. Under this principle, the government is free to determine at what point secrecy becomes an offense against the public weal, and may then take steps to overcome it. Wire tapping, the reading of another's mail, forced entry into homes and business establishments (particularly if clearly locked) are now seen to be justified. This, the latest of Mr. Eisenhower's creations, is also the most revolutionary, overthrowing a purely traditional concept going back to the Magna Charta.

PAUL WEISS
Dept. of Philosophy, Yale University
New Haven, Conn.

Bill of Rights Fund

Dear Sirs: The Bill of Rights Fund is making its annual appeal for contributions to render financial aid to many brave Americans defending themselves in the courts today because they have stood up uncompromisingly for the First Amendment or for some other important aspect of civil liberties.

A number of different organizations in this country are doing splendid work for civil liberties. But the Bill of Rights Fund is the only one whose sole function is to raise money and make financial grants to individuals and organizations fighting for the basic freedoms guaranteed under our Constitution. That fight goes on unceasingly, as is shown by the continuing assaults of the House Un-American Activities Committee on the liberties of the American people.

The Bill of Rights Fund assists at the vital point of financial need those whom the government prosecutes in violation of fundamental Constitutional guarantees. We appeal to all civil libertarians to give generously at this critical juncture in the struggle for freedom. Contributions can be sent to me at 450 Riverside Drive, New York 27, N.Y. All contributors will receive a Five-Year Summary of Grants which the Fund has made through 1959.

CORLISS LAMONT
Chairman, Bill of Rights Fund

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NEW YORK, SATURDAY, JUNE 18, 1960
VOLUME 190, No. 25

THE NATION

EDITORIALS

The Rockefeller Emblem

In the last month, Governor Nelson Rockefeller has emerged as the country's ablest political pinch hitter; twice now he has come to bat in the ninth inning, score tied, two out, none on — and has belted the first pitch right out of the park. He has great power, he keeps his eye on the ball, his timing is perfect. In his forceful, well-timed statement of May 24, in which he called for "an open and honest exercise of reason" — that is, for full-scale debate on the key issues — he effectively discouraged the Republican hatchetmen in Washington who were dusting off McCarthy's old weapons. Now, in a skillfully prepared and artfully executed maneuver, he has again demanded an open, honest, no-holds-barred debate; but this time, his challenge is pointedly addressed to Vice President Nixon. The best Democratic sloganeers could not improve on the Governor's trenchant statements, which will echo from now until November: "We cannot . . . march to meet the future with a banner aloft whose only emblem is a question mark"; "The path of great leadership does not lie along the top of a fence." The words may well be those of the Governor's talented "ghost" — J. Emmett Hughes — but the directness behind them is the Governor's special quality, a quality that is a prime ingredient of his charm as a politician. Not only has he succeeded in focusing public attention on the weakness of the Republican Party and its current leadership (see Robert Spivack's article, p. 531), but he has revealed, in utter starkness, his own position.

If this late in the political season Vice President Nixon's banner still carries the emblem of the question mark, the banner which the Governor has now unfurled is emblazoned with crossed missiles, oil derricks in the middle distance, and grim underground shelters in the background. Points 1, 2 and 3 of his ten-point program are strong big-arms planks calculated to delight missile-makers, cool warriors and the top brass. If he had his way, the Governor would up defense spending by $3 billion, immediately; and it is quite clear that this would represent only a small beginning for what he has in mind. To be sure, he has wrapped his grisly program in some attractive domestic issues — civil rights, federal aid to education, medical care for the aged, etc., — but big arms spending is the conspicuous core of this "modern" Republican's political thinking.

We have reason to be grateful to the Governor for his insistence — which he himself honors — that politicians must exhibit candor and courage in these times which, as he correctly states, are not "conventional." Not only has he exposed the bankruptcy of the Republican Administration, of which the Vice President is the sole residual legatee, but he has made his own basic attitudes and positions crystal clear. Governor Rockefeller has placed himself both now and for 1964 (if need be) at the head of the pack of big-arms spenders and cold-war "muscle" men.

To *Nation* Readers

After July 9, and through August, *The Nation* will appear on alternate weeks only, i.e., on July 23, August 6 and August 20. The weekly schedule will be resumed with the issue of September 3.

It's Much Later Than You Think

With the Democratic convention only a matter of days ahead, a large and influential section of the "egghead" community is still bemused by the pernicious dogma that a large built-in "against Nixon" vote exists throughout the fifty states of a magnitude which automatically insures his defeat by any nominee the Democrats name. We have read the surveys and reports — the doorstep interviews with housewives in Detroit, over-the-fence chats with farmers in Iowa, and man-in-the-street parleys in the big cities — which are tiresomely cited in support of the dogma. We, too, know any number of voters who say "there is something about that man I don't like"; we don't like him, either. But solid evidence has convinced us that Richard M. Nixon is a strong Republican nominee; witness his showing in the states of New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Indiana and California, in none of which did he personally conduct an active campaign. In the wake of the Summit debacle,

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we suspect that he is the strongest nominee the Republicans could name.

But we are impressed by the fact that each of the leading Democratic contenders is subject to a large, built-in "veto" vote. A decisive "against Johnson" vote can be found in the states north of the Mason-Dixon line, including, we suspect, the border states. A large, if not equally decisive, "against Symington" vote has been noted by many commentators. That there is a large "against Kennedy" vote was clearly demonstrated in Indiana, where two preposterous rivals, both unknown, polled nearly a third of the Democratic ballots. Our liking and admiration for Senator Kennedy does not blind us to the fact that he is Vice President Nixon's favorite for the Democratic nomination. Let the Democrats be forewarned: only their strongest possible ticket is likely to defeat Nixon. That, as we have said before, is a Stevenson-Kennedy ticket.

Coming Apart at the Seams

What is happening in Turkey, Korea, Japan and all around the fringes? Why are regimes friendly to the United States overthrown or threatened with insurrection? Why do the mobs never bring down a neutralist regime and supplant it with a pro-U.S. one?

The easy answer — that it is all due to the machinations of the Russians — is also the most ineffectual and dangerous. C. Wright Mills (see page 523) is much nearer the truth when he makes the point that we base political policy on the dictates of military strategy, while the Russians base military strategy on political policy. The containment policy of John Foster Dulles and Dean Acheson was to build "situations of strength" in the peripheral areas where the Soviet spearheads encountered ours. This meant military and sometimes other kinds of aid — but military aid and collaboration came first. Its magnitude varied, but in places like Korea and Formosa it was enormous; these small countries became, in effect, military outposts of the United States. Then we had to safeguard our investment: although our intentions were not imperialist, the technique was the classical one of maintaining "reliable" regimes in power. But since we were fighting communism, the reliable elements were right wing by definition. We not only had to prevent the Soviets from marching in if they had that intention, but we (or rather our policy-makers) had to acquire allies who would be actively hostile to communism. In fact, in many cases there was not the least danger of military assault and what we, and the elements we hooked up with, really feared was "infiltration," "subversion" and — although this last was never admitted — radical social change of any kind, even when proposed by non-Communists. All this took place in an era and atmosphere which even our most conservative publicists call "revolutionary" (though without drawing the necessary inferences).

But, as might have been expected, the reliable elements had objectives of their own. With the exception of Chiang Kai-shek, who really would like to return to the mainland but can't, most of our allies never had the slightest intention of fighting Communists. They used our arms to clobber the domestic opposition, whose grievances increased as the regimes became increasingly corrupt, dictatorial and reckless. Our policy-makers, in accordance with Santayana's definition of fanaticism, then redoubled their efforts, having forgotten their aims. Gradually all the forces of nationalism were mobilized against us.

In the meantime, the local Reds were not asleep. The situation was made to order for them: newspapers were being suppressed, elections rigged, dissenters tortured and murdered. Tear gas and guns were the regimes' only remedies for popular discontent. Thus, no matter how much the local democratic opposition and the local Reds detested each other, they perforce became allies against the rightist rulers. Finally enough resolute souls, i.e., men (and boys) willing to die for a cause, were mobilized to knock over one regime after another — and the end is not yet. What the outcome will be no one knows, but the policy of military containment, using such containers as Rhee, Menderes, Batista, Nuri, Franco, Chamoun, Chiang and other strong-arm operators — that policy has failed. What remains of American prestige and reputation can be saved only if the failure is recognized and the policy is changed, and soon.

The Last P. R. Problem

The public relations men of the Air Force, who fight with their typewriters as the French are said in a well-known ditty to fight with their feet, cope with problems as terrible as any encountered by pilots or bombardiers. When a fire destroyed a nuclear-tipped Bomarc missile at McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey, they hastened to assure the public that there was no radiation danger. We have now had at least nine accidents involving nuclear bombs or warheads, not counting accidents in laboratories which, whenever possible, are not publicized. In each case the P. R. boys repeated the same assurances — the bombs are not armed until they are to be fired in anger, the safeguards are foolproof, a complex of electrical switches and mechanical interlocks must be activated, and so on. Nobody really believes them, for everyone knows that no system is infallible against human error or insanity. If an American uranium bomb, or worse, an American hydrogen bomb, should explode on American soil, we cannot say that providence gave us no warning. But that will be the grand opportunity for the

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infinitely resourceful publicists of the Air Force. They have been through so many dry runs, we may be sure they will acquit themselves creditably.

First, they will deny there was an explosion. Then they will say there was an explosion, but there is absolutely no radiation danger. The next bulletin will admit a few hundred thousand casualties, but assure the public that the danger is past and point out that, after all, the survival of the nation requires some sacrifices. Finally, they may reluctantly confess that while New Jersey (or Nebraska or California) still exists as a spot on the map, there are no longer any people there — those that were left after the blast were evacuated by the Air Force, Civil Defense having been wiped out by the explosion.

In this sequence of messages the Air Force will be able to follow a distinguished model, established early in May, 1960, by NASA, the State Department, the White House, CIA and other federal experts in the art of sowing confusion.

Sex and Cereals

A year and a half ago an important television personage told us that Westerns were proving a great disappointment to their sponsors. The audience was the largest in human history, but the goods did not seem to be moving off the shelves. It appeared, our informant said, that the viewers were so stultified by all that blood and sentimentality that they were unable to grasp the commercial message.

This sounded great, but the fellow was producer of a high-brow show that had just lost its network spot, and it occurred to us that his views might be tainted. But now comes a man from the very heart of the business, an executive of a large advertising firm, with the same story to tell.

Ernest J. Hodges, Vice President of Guild, Bascom and Bonfigli in San Francisco, put the case as follows to a gathering of the Hollywood Advertising Club:

> The bulk of prime time network TV programing is like Oscar Wilde's dead mackerel in the moonlight—it glitters but it stinks. It stinks two ways—on the upwind of quality and public service and on the downwind as a vehicle for commercials that can persuade people to buy our client's product.

It is hard, said Mr. Hodges, to convince people that the program delivering the largest audience is not necessarily doing the best sales job, hard to prove that "an audience viewing a violent, bloody, or sexy suspense show is simply not attuned to listening carefully and happily to a commercial intrusion."

But given a client willing to experiment, the proof can be forthcoming. Mr. Hodges' firm handles the advertising for a line of dry cereals manufactured by the Ralston company. Almost the entire advertising budget for these products has been spent in recent years on television travel shows, first *Bold Journey*, then John Gunther's *High Road*. The programs are not sensational and have never had sensational ratings; in fact, the agency has fought a running battle with the network to get even half-way decent time for the shows. In the first year of this advertising, the Ralston foods registered a 34 per cent increase in sales against an industry gain of 5 per cent. In five years the Ralston cereals have tripled their share of the market.

At present, 150,000 classroom teachers are calling *High Road* to the notice of 7 million students. Ralston operates on the premise that it cannot terrify, disgust or erotically stimulate an audience into buying a particular dry cereal, but that it may be able to engage that audience's confidence by offering a pleasantly instructive show. The only thing startling about that reasoning is that it proves to be right.

Of course, as Mr. Hodges said in closing, "It's nice to know that you are a citizen as well as a businessman."

THE BALANCE OF BLAME . . *by C. Wright Mills*

THE DEBACLE at the Summit last month once again illustrates the immediate causes of World War III. These lie in the fearful symmetry of the cold warriors on either side: An act of one aggravates the other, the other reacts, and this in turn aggravates the one. Behind this symmetry, there are intermediate causes: the frigid context and the lethal establishments formed by previous policies and lack of policies of either side. The ultimate causes, of course, seem part of the very shaping of world history in the twentieth century.

Each of the embattled camps contains men and forces that are working for peace and also men and forces that mean war. But in the interaction of the two camps there is one terrible difference between the politics of warmakers and the politics of peacemakers: while the gains made by the warmakers within each bloc tend to accumulate, this is not so much the case with the peacemakers in each bloc. The scheduling of material measures of defense and attack—the immediate source of the peril — is speeded up and increased in volume by the successes of the war parties and by their interplay; and these measures are often difficult to cancel. The wreckers on either side readily strengthen the wreckers on the other — and the fearful dialectic between the two is heightened. The mutual fright on

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which this dialectic feeds and which it increases, accumulates more rapidly and with deeper results than does any mutual trust slowly, tortuously, built by the peacemakers.

This symmetry in elite action, and the advantages of the warmakers on either side, are readily illustrated by the blowup of the Summit.

I

WHEN THE statesmen came to Paris for their meeting, they did not come alone and they did not enter a vacuum; each brought with him a legacy of policies and each was a focal point of pressure from within his own nation and his own bloc of states.

In the United States camp the war forces, I think, were generally ascendant during the two-year period preceding the scheduled meeting. The most immediate and obvious token of this fact was the flight of the U-2, which occurred, we must remember, on the eve of the scheduled Paris meeting while negotiations to stop atomic testing were under way, and at a stage in military technology when it is obvious that a mistaken interpretation of any such flight as an attack could cause a genuine counterattack and thus precipitate World War III.

On the basis of any reasonable meaning of the words, the U-2 flights were provocative; they were a clear violation of international law; more than that, they were acts of aggression. We know of course that "sovereignty" and "aggression" are words subject to endless legalistic definition, and that each side is often, if not continually, "committing acts of aggression" against the other. But we have merely to ask ourselves what the Americans would do were a Soviet jet shot down 1,200 miles inside "the sovereign territory of the United States." True, satellites launched by Russians and Americans are flying around the globe over all nations, but so far we have not been informed that these are capable of delivering an atomic attack: jet planes *are* capable of doing just that. The possibility of "accidental" misinterpretation of their intent, if nothing else, places planes and satellites in different categories, at least for the time being. It is also true that all states of world significance employ espionage, but a jet espionage plane, flying over another country's territory, is surely a different matter than a man in a cloak or attached to an embassy with a box full of microphones.

But still, a way out was left open by the Russians, for the President at least. He did not take it; he did not disclaim knowledge of the adventure in the normal diplomatic manner expected. For the first time in modern history, the head of a state declared his personal responsibility for an act of espionage.

Moreover, high officials of the United States lied—and were caught flatfooted in their lies. First it was said that the plane was on a weather mission and had accidentally lost its way along the border — and that the United States has never deliberately violated Soviet air space; then it was said that United States planes had flown over Russia, but that this U-2 flight was not authorized by Washington; then it was announced that such flights *were* authorized, that the President was quite aware of them, and that if judged necessary for defense, they would go on. It was also admitted that such flights had been going on for several years. To invade the air space of other sovereign states at jet-flight levels — that represents a long-range and now avowed policy of the United States.

A short while before the Summit, the President asserted that he might leave the meetings early, delegating his part in the negotiations to a subordinate. Later, during the interchange of invective, this subordinate, who has a good chance of being the next President of the United States, defended the U-2 flights "under present conditions." While negotiations at Geneva on atomic tests were going on, the United States announced the resumption of nuclear underground test explosions, thus unilaterally breaking the uneasy moratorium on such tests in effect since 1958. A few days later, the announcement was modified; now the news was that nuclear explosions were not to be included in the series. During the attempted Summit, the United States defense chief ordered a world-wide military alert, a "pre-combat readiness test."

These later developments — following the shooting down of the U-2 — were, of course, responses to Soviet behavior, part of the interaction between the two. What were the actions of the other side, of the Soviet Union?

THE SOVIET UNION, and certainly the Soviet bloc, is not altogether monolithic. It, too, contains peace forces and forces that mean war. Mr. Khrushchev, it seems clear, is not a dictator in the manner of Stalin; he is the lead man of a small collegial body that is at the center of the Soviet power elite. Within this elite, different lines of policy are argued, and these arguments are responsive to alternative policies advanced by outsiders—the Chinese elite, for example, or the demands of the Russian people for higher material standards of life. In the period before the Summit meeting, Mr. Khrushchev had managed to hold back the cold-war forces in his camp. In fact, inside this camp his own career, so far as it involves decisions about foreign affairs, rests upon the policy of coexistence and negotiation. In his attempts to put through such a set of policies, he has accumulated opponents in his own higher circles and in those of his most important ally. For these opponents of his policies, the U-2 flight and the way its discovery was han-

About the Author

C. Wright Mills, Professor of Sociology at Columbia University, is the author of many books which have been widely translated in both Eastern and Western Europe, as well as in Latin America. His latest book is *Images of Man* (George Braziller, 1960).

This essay is composed of materials used in a 1960 revision of *The Causes of World War III,* which Ballantine Books is bringing out shortly as a paperback. Many reviewers considered *The Causes of World War III,* originally published in 1958, to be one of the outstanding American contributions to current thought on international issues.

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dled by United States officials were the last straw, providing the excuse needed. Here indeed, as Governor Stevenson said of the flight itself, was the "crowbar and the sledge hammer" for the cold warriors of the Soviet bloc.

Whether or not Mr. Khrushchev changed his own mind is less important than the fact that as lead man of his own elite, he behaved in Paris with ferocious rudeness: he asserted that Mr. Eisenhower—scheduled to visit the Soviet Union—would not now be welcome there; and he demanded that the President condemn such flights, that those "directly guilty" for them be punished, and that promises be made that such flights be discontinued. Only then did Mr. Eisenhower state that the U-2 flights had been "suspended" since the incident of May 1, and "are not to be resumed." This, it was reported, "surprises Washington." He refused to meet the other two demands in part or in whole. He did not seek out Mr. Khrushchev and apologize for the flight; he did not publicly recognize that such flights were a violation of international law. He insisted that the United States had done no wrong.

Soviet spokesmen blamed the United States invasion of their sovereignty and Washington's handling of the incident for the blowup of the Summit. Then in Berlin, Mr. Khrushchev —unexpectedly—took a conciliatory line on the German question. United States and NATO spokesmen generally blamed Mr. Khrushchev's behavior in Paris for the failure of the Summit to get under way; they accused him of attempting to destroy the President's reputation as a world leader. Never for a moment did they acknowledge that the United States' handling of the U-2 incident might have been the major reason for Mr. Khrushchev's behavior in Paris.

LET US for a moment back away from this particular series of events. Can any objective analysis of recent international affairs lead us to the view that the Soviet Union is continually and unilaterally responsible for the peril of war? Is it not clear that there is a balance of blame for the cold-war mechanics that are taking mankind towards World War III? In the event of war, I know the following question might become irrelevant, but it is not yet so. Suppose that war did occur, for example by accidental misinterpretation of espionage planes as atomic attackers: who, then, would be more responsible—the United States or the Soviet Union?

The answer to any such question, I think, varies with different periods of the postwar era. As of this writing, I think the answer is that the balance of blame would lie more with the United States. But such balances, on the one side or on the other, are of little comfort to sane men on either side. The vital fact is that there *is* a balance of blame, not where the blame lies at any given moment. This lethal symmetry of action is what is vital, for in it lies the stategic causes of World War III.

II

WHEN THE news of the U-2 flight was announced, I was in Moscow completing a series of interviews with Soviet intellectuals. I had gone there to gather material needed for several research projects. One aspect of my experience impressed me so forcibly that I feel the need to express it here.

The intellectual and moral differences between the Soviet and the NATO peoples are much deeper than differences of opinion, of political rhetoric, of ideals, of sincerity of conviction, of levels of reasonableness. So far as their discourse and beliefs are concerned, what separates the two worlds is nothing less than the very definitions of reality in terms of which each observes, thinks, feels and judges. Behind this difference, of course, there are enormous differences of experience, in fact differences of history itself. When one is there, one is constantly aware of the fact that opinion and information, even of the simplest sort, is distorted (on both sides) by the screen of wholesale condemnation. I am quite certain that for differing reasons this censorship of understanding (even of the effort to understand what the other is all about) is as great on the Western side as on the Eastern. There is a curtain of iron; there is also on this side of it a curtain of stainless steel. And both are in the mind as well as on the frontiers.

Any understanding is made impossible if one's mind is always tightened up by one's own nationalist definitions of reality, or by the terms derived from one's experience of, or with, Stalinism. One cannot merely react to a word, a slogan, a proposition which Soviet intellectuals or decision-makers use, thus assuming that one has understood the intended meaning. One must patiently seek out the meaning; one must slowly build a vocabulary adequate to the meanings intended by the other.

Only a few people on either side are engaged in this sort of work.* And, of course, Westerners who try are liable to be taken to task for "not really understanding the Communist menace," of "being soft on communism." Translated, I think this charge usually means:

1. That one is not satisfied to accept the official and quasi-official definitions of world reality, and in particular of Soviet reality, that now form a common denominator of belief in the NATO countries. On many specific points about the Soviet Union's domestic affairs and international relations—points merely assumed in my own country—I am in no position to make judgments. Either I am ambivalent or I admit to plain ignorance. Moreover, I do not think anyone else really knows the facts on which to make judgments; the kind of work required has not been done by very many, and often political conditions are such that even the effort cannot be made. As for the higher circles of decision-makers and semi-official spokesmen in either country, I cannot persuade myself that a fruitful number of them are up to the effort required to understand the other's views.

2. The easy charge of being "naive about the Russians" means, I believe, that many of those who do assume that they "know all about this evil" have made up their minds about the

* The works of two men writing in English, E. H. Carr and Isaac Deutscher, are indispensable to an understanding of the history and the present policies of the Soviet Union.

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

Peace News (London)

"Tired of people? We could start a world war. . . ."

Soviet Union from a great distance and some time ago. Many Western intellectuals have been hurt deeply by their own participation in Communist and other radical movements. They think about the Soviet Union in terms that are heavily freighted with their own experience with Western Communist parties, most usually during the Stalinist era. Many such people are now members of the old futilitarians of the dead Left. In this respect, I suppose I have been fortunate: Due largely to accidents of my biography, I have never belonged and—as the phrase goes—do not now belong to any political organization, Communist or otherwise. Nor, so far as I am aware, have I been a "fellow traveler" of any such organization.

3. Perhaps that is why, in discussing war and peace, I have not felt it necessary or very useful endlessly to repeat what every American newspaper is full of: the unchanging evils of the Soviet rulers. The enormous mass of this sort of writing (which assumes the unilateral guilt of the Soviets for the menace of war) serves to freeze the deadlock at which we find ourselves. It is that deadlock which must be broken, and the only possible way to try to break it is to begin at home. To do that one must, as an American writer, try to bring into severe question the monolithic cold-war posture of his own countrymen and intellectual colleagues. Perhaps were I writing, for example, as a Britisher and mainly for Britain, I would not need to place such stress on this. In that country there has been going on a wide-ranging and quite real debate. In the United States, there has been less a public debate than the noisy interchange of bipartisan banalities and the weary complaining of the old futilitarians.

DURING the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, we ought to remember, many generations of social scientists focused their work upon the origins and development of liberal capitalism as a world historical phenomenon. Surely Hans Gerth is correct when he remarks that, in a similar way, we must now turn our attention to the rise and development of communism in its several varieties. Confronted with such a task, anyone who does not experience a great intellectual humility is surely a fool. This is not, of course, a "know-nothing" attitude—although I am aware that dogmatists on either side of the world encounter will undoubtedly assert that it is. But no matter. Such exploratory essays as this one cannot be for them. They will not give up their own images, if only because they are so clear and simple.

If we would have half a chance to think clearly, to understand something so many-sided as the cold war, we must bear in mind what is required of us before we can know. It involves no less than the attempts to understand the whole world scene. I think it is time, just now, for a full-scale reappraisal of "the Soviet phenomena" by the Western intellectual community—not from the standpoints of Western Communist parties, of the cold war, of the Soviet's own ideology, of the collapse of various Marxian, non-Communist interpretations about its realities. What is needed is a reappraisal from the standpoint of the Soviet Union's place today in world history and of its meanings for the whole idea of a new Left, in the Western countries and in the underdeveloped regions. In the end, it is the image of the Soviet bloc and the quality of the disillusionment with communism that is the point of origin for the weary sophistication about political new beginnings in the United States, all the withdrawal from political concerns, all the fashionable quietism, all the denial of hope itself—in brief, for the wholesale cultural and political default of NATO intellectuals during the past decade and a half.

If we reject this posture, then we must carry on from there by making clear our answer to the question: just what do we think of the Soviet bloc and of its prospects?

IT IS NOT possible to give here my own full answer to that question; nor is it necessary. So far as Russia is concerned, what is relevant to the issue of war and to the politics of peace is our view of her foreign policy, and of her domestic and bloc affairs insofar as they are likely to affect that policy.

To do even this much requires that we make a serious attempt to draw back from the immediate scene and consider the world encounter in something of a historical context. It requires also that we continually keep in mind certain comparisons of the Soviet Union and the United States. For example, it is clear that different images of the Soviet Union turn not only on how seriously we take the new beginnings there since the death of Stalin, but also how seriously we take the lack of new beginnings and the disuse of formal freedom in the United States since World War II. Weary old stereotypes and fanatical abstractions obstruct our judgment of both.

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The black-and-white view is not adequate. It is not true that the one side is dogmatic, the other side open-minded. Whether one agrees with them or not, the views of many Soviet spokesmen and intellectuals are every bit as "reasonable" as those of many Americans. Soviet men and women, moreover, are every bit as "sincere" as are Americans—and often, I think, more so, if only because they have experienced war in a manner quite beyond the actual experience of Americans.

I do not believe the Soviet bloc is a total lie, and the American alliance a half-truth. Both are full of lies; both are full of truths; the ideological war that they wage is, more often than not, a conflict of hypocrisies. And in both of these systems, the one big lie that ought to concern us most is the military: the lie that war is still a basis for any conceivably human policy. On this point, the balance of blame is very difficult indeed to draw up, but of course behind this common military metaphysic there are two quite different systems of life, at different stages of historical development, and also different kinds of development and aims.

1. FIRST OF ALL, we must continually recognize the enormity of the Soviet's experience in World War II. No one can talk with anyone in the Soviet Union without realizing what twenty million dead has meant to them: it is beyond the imaginative power of most Americans, for whom the war meant a very small proportion of dead, and no devastation at all. On the contrary, the war meant a great boom.

2. For the Soviets, "the West" includes West Germany, which yesterday was Nazi Germany and which today, rebuilt by United States aid, is NATO's spearhead, and tomorrow will be fully nuclear. They remember the long wait for a Second Front; the sudden ending of lend-lease aid when the shooting stopped; the threat "to roll back" what they see as the Soviet buffer power, when the United States felt it had a monopoly on atomic weaponry. And they see the U.S. bases for missilry and for SAC—both armed with H-bombs—encircling them, and used as the take-off points for invasions by jet planes of their air space.

3. In view of all this, and much more—some true, some imaginary—they see Soviet diplomacy, and especially Mr. Khrushchev's efforts, as most conciliatory: they reduced their armed forces twice, which even if militarily unimportant, is important to them; they stopped nuclear testing unilaterally; they terminated some bases abroad; they took the initiative in the evacuation and neutralizing of Austria; they exerted themselves in trying to stop the civil war in Indochina; they have tried continually to talk with Western leaders in an effort to reduce tensions; and they have proposed what they think of as the major plan for total disarmament; and—after the Summit debacle—they have refrained from the expected action on Berlin, and reformulated their disarmament proposals in an effort to meet various Western objections.* Forget, for the moment, their motives, cynical or not; the point is, they have constantly taken the initiative.

4. The Soviet people also remember well—although ambivalently as yet—what Stalinism meant. They remember the forced labor, the terror, the spying, the inhuman acts. And they feel now, since his death, that they've begun to get a new deal. At the top of this feeling there is the desire and the expectation that they are going to have more and better consumers' goods and a relief from harsh labor; they hope that labor itself is going to be made, by automation and by organization, more pleasant.

AGAIN, it does not matter so much whether *we* believe this; the point is that many of *them* believe it. And it is upon the basis of such beliefs that Soviet foreign policy is built. That policy now rests upon their general world outlook, the course of the cold war and of Soviet diplomacy during it, and the feeling of getting a new break.

Let us now reconsider a few points about which many of us have already had our minds made up for us.

* Some of these points I have taken from Adlai Stevenson's speech of June 1, 1960; others from Isaac Deutscher's recent lectures in Canada, **The Great Contest (New York, Oxford, 1960).**

III

"CAN WE trust the Russians?" The answer is No. As a simple matter of faith, we cannot trust the elite of any great power state. We cannot—we, meaning ordinary men and women—cannot trust our own leaders, either; nor the CIA, the top echelons of the Pentagon, nor the men of SAC. We cannot trust de Gaulle or "the French." All of which is merely to say: It's dangerous all over.

Any state, any power, can be trusted only insofar as what is at issue appears to it to be in its own interest. The useful question, accordingly, is not, can this or that nation or elite be trusted? but, first, what do they believe is to their interest? and second, are they sane or insane about the use of nuclear weaponry? The answer to the second question, I believe, for both the American and the Soviet elite is: They would seem to be more insane than sane. But consider the first question.

Aggression is not some eternal characteristic of any state; it is a feature at one time or another during the rise of all great power states. It is the weak nation that tends to be "the troublemaker," the strong nation that calls for "peace and order"; for the strong feel—with justification—that they can continue their economic and political ascendancy without "making trouble," without resorting to open violence. Policies for peace are all the easier to pursue when you are already on top of world affairs, especially economic affairs. Moreover, you are in a position then to make treaties and other agreements that are to your interest, and such treaties are more likely to be honored than are those which in various degrees have been forced upon you by your weakness. It is, as E. H. Carr has indicated, something like business-labor squabbles: the stronger is "all for peace," the weaker is the "troublemaker"; the cards being stacked against them, that is the only way the weaker can see to gain whatever they want.

During most of its brief history, the Soviet Union has been very

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weak among the states of the world —militarily, and also economically, politically and culturally; it has not had the industrial grid, its population has been uneducated, and it has suffered the moral onus of political and cultural tyranny.

But now, in 1960, various features of the general weakness of the Soviets have been eliminated; others are in process of elimination. In fact, the world equilibrium of weakness and strength is shifting and probably will continue to shift; in the next two or three decades, perhaps in less time, it will be "the West" that is becoming the weaker, the Sino-Soviet bloc, the stronger. It is happening first in military matters; but soon it will become apparent in general economic levels, and in the cultural power to attract the underdeveloped and the uncommitted world.

It is during this world historical shift—as it becomes more generally obvious—that, out of its weakness, the West may be tempted to become the "troublemaker." On the basis of this great shift, "the balance of blame" for war may well also shift; the blame may move more towards the West, in particular the United States.

BACK OF THIS whole shift there is indeed a competition of economic and political systems: the one publicly owned and centrally planned, the other capitalist in economy—with mixed elements and with some welfare subsidies — and formally democratic in its political organization.

So far as the science machines of each system is concerned, the Soviets already reveal their advantages. I believe, if there is no war, they will also reveal the advantages of their economy, including, above all, higher and more equalitarian standards of living. It is not at all unreasonable to believe, as Isaac Deutscher has suggested, that this will lead to greater political and cultural freedom—first because of the greater social efficiencies which such freedom provides, and second because of the political pressures of the highly educated population that the Soviet Union is going to have.

Whether we believe all this or not matters less than that the Soviets do believe it. In view of this, what is Soviet foreign policy today?

The master aims of the Soviets' policy are (1) to maintain the existing boundaries of the Sino-Soviet bloc; (2) to consolidate the material and other gains that have been made at such terrible cost; and (3) to increase these gains within their consolidated boundaries. Moreover, the Russians are a people aware of a plan: they want and they expect, if there is no war, to transform what is rightly called "Stalin's empire" into an international economic and political unit which will flourish economically as a whole, and each member of which will be politically stable.*

For them peaceful coexistence is not merely a slogan or a deception. It is a yearning and it is a guide line. Their aim abroad is—above all—to gain time in which "to make a demonstration" of the economic and political results of their system at home. As far as "the rest of the world" is concerned, they believe that such a demonstration of the superiority of their system will be sufficient "to bring them over."

These feelings and these aims, I believe, pervade Soviet society today, from its still half-Stalinist elite to its most primitive collective farm. For some Soviet citizens, it is "only a hope"; for others, it is a probability. But it is in view of such feelings and in terms of such aims that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union must be understood.

That the Russians want to do all this, there can be little doubt; that they can do all this, if there is no war, they have little doubt. We must always remember that they believe time is on their side—*and* on the side of peaceful change in the world. They think their system can defeat capitalism on every front by peaceful competition, which means without resort to force or violence.

IV

NO PEOPLE want war; that goes without saying. The questions are: what about the deciders, and what about their ideas of the means and policies that are now "needed"?

The Soviet elite as a whole do not want war; they are very busy with many other things, and they see clearly what is a fact about their own economy—that war preparation is sheer waste.

The United States elite as a whole do not want war, either. But the historical position they occupy within U.S. society and in the world divides them deeply; their dogmatic pursuit of certain interests they hold dear makes it likely, on balance, that they will adopt policies that further the chances of war:

1. The frequent Soviet charge that "U.S. munitions makers" are causing the cold war I do not think an adequate statement of the economics of the situation. Some corporations do indeed urge the continual preparation for war, and the relation in many minds between such preparation and possible slump, or between these preparations and continuing prosperity, cannot be denied. Capitalist profits of quite huge amounts *are* made out of war preparations in the United States; to an unknown but probably considerable extent, the prosperity of capitalism probably *is* based on war preparations. These facts cannot be considered as making for peace in the world. Certainly that is a minimum statement of the case.

2. We should remember that there is no market other than the military for the products made under many quite enormous contracts with aircraft, missile, electronic and spacecraft corporations. Moreover, the research, development and manufacture of such weaponry are very much in line with the crackpot waste built into U.S. capitalism; in a truly beautiful way, they combine inflation with quick obsolescence. If there ever was a capitalist boondoggle, this is it. Defense spending does not compete with private enterprise; it does not conflict with the short-run interests of any major pressure group; it does not lead to any serious domestic political issues. True, it makes for higher taxes, but corporations are now able to treat much of their tax load as part of their "costs of production," to be passed on to consumers. Moreover, the sort of government programs that would be

*cf. Deutscher, *op. cit.*

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necessary, in the opinion of many economists, to replace the defense economy—to maintain prosperity without arms—are exactly the sort that are most distasteful, politically and economically, to those who, in the name of free enterprise, now benefit politically and economically from the arms race. Imagine the uproar were it proposed to launch a $60 billion "socialistic" program of urban renewal, valley development, school construction? Welfare spending *does* compete with private enterprise; it *does* conflict with the short-run interests of major pressure groups; it *does* lead to domestic political issues; it does increase taxation, etc.*

Certainly a major political effort would be required to do away with the permanent war economy of the United States. It has been, and it is, a major basis of this nation's prosperity—and a built-in part of the U.S. drift and thrust toward World War III.

3. None of this sort of economics is true of the Soviet Union. Whatever the case in the United States, in the Soviet Union there are no internal economic reasons for war preparation, nor for imperialism in any form. The situation was different immediately following World War II, when the economic motive was conquest for booty: the attempt to further "original accumulation" and to make good the devastation of World War II. But this is no longer the case; their industrial momentum allows the Soviets easier ways to continue their industrialization.

4. The power of the U.S. elite as it is now politically constituted rests very largely upon the permanent war economy and the military ascendancy. These in turn rest publicly upon the maintenance of a paranoiac view of the Soviet Union, as well as upon the military metaphysic. That the formal mechanisms of more democratic methods of decision exist here makes all the more urgent the maintenance of such conditions. In the Soviet Union, it has been true that internal political command has rested to some extent upon the fear of attack from outside, but as the standard of living rises and other successes of the economy become evident, and as the regime becomes more firmly legitimatized—and it is so becoming—this basis for political stability declines in importance. Increasingly, the rule of the Soviet elite rests less upon fear of war than upon the realization of plans for domestic development.

5. Just now the United States is, or feels itself to be, behind the Soviet Union in the arms race, especially in missiles. Given their military metaphysic, this must be an experience of desperation for the power elite. Accordingly, they are likely to continue with their utmost energy the attempt to gain "a position of strength," i.e., to continue their pursuit of the endless spiral. There are good reasons to believe, moreover, that Soviet technology will continue to lead, less perhaps because of the excellence of their science machine than because of the capitalist stupidity of the United States.

6. Many U.S. decision-makers and spokesmen are coming to believe that time is on the side of the Soviet system; indeed, that "history" itself is going against our system. The truth, I believe, is that among some sections of the U.S. power elite and some circles of NATO intellectuals, there is a growing sense of the whole Soviet prospect as I have outlined it above. Many key members of the power elite are coming to believe that the Soviet Union has a momentum and a sense of direction far greater, far more vital, than the United States and other Western capitalist powers. They are very much afraid of the outcome of a peaceful competition between the two systems. Only by an act of military will, some of them believe, can the United States win out in the competition between the two systems—although what such a "victory" might mean, they do not really know, or at least never say. The Soviets believe that they can win without war.

Someday, somebody may press the panic button.

I think that is the degree of truth contained in the idea that Soviet military strategy is an adjunct of political policy, whereas the United States has made its political policy an adjunct of its military strategy. What *is* the world *political* policy of the United States of America?

THE PROSPECT I have outlined is only one basis of Soviet policy. The Soviet elite still do cling to the military metaphysic; they still have in their camp an up-coming nation, China, which is still adventurously weak in international affairs. Like the American, the Soviets' elite persist in the delusion that nuclear war is still a means to ends other than the suicide of mankind. Is there any doubt that they will resort to nuclear violence if they feel they need to in order to "defend" their system and make possible the fulfillment of their many domestic plans and aims?

If the fateful interaction of the "war parties" on either side continues, and their ascendancy within each bloc goes on, then it will not matter much where the over-all, historic balance of blame lies at any given phase of the interplay towards mutual annihilation. To break the deadlock, to break out of the spiral of causes, unilateral action is now necessary.

At this juncture, the point about the balance of blame that I want most to make is that if the United States will now take the initiative, in a manner I shall presently describe, there are good reasons to believe that the Soviet Union will

*See Paul Sweezy's essay — the best brief account I have seen of these matters — in *The Nation*, March 28, 1959.

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quickly follow suit. For the forces within Soviet society that would press the country's elite in this direction are very strong. Why, then, does not the United States try to shift the balance of blame? Why does it not *make clear that* it is *not* afraid to meet, in political, cultural and economic terms, the fact of the Soviet Union and its bloc?

That the United States ought now to take the initiative is easy to say. *And* it is easy to do. Moreover, it is easy to state how it might be done with the fullest measure of "military safety."

V

WHAT THE United States ought to do is to announce to the world an over-all program in which we specify the approximate dates on which each of the plan's provisions is going to be put into effect. The initial actions should be unilateral. We should say: The United States is going to do this and this and this, regardless of what other states—allies or enemies—do or fail to do. Later provisions of the plan, our announcement should make clear, will be put into effect if other states respond in stated ways to our initial actions and to the plan as a whole. These later steps are subject to later negotiations to be held after the United States has begun to act out the plan.

By taking the initiative, then, I do not mean merely to talk; I mean to talk and to begin to act. It is not, of course, necessary to carry the principle of unilateral action "to an extreme." No government, for example, is going at once to destroy all of its weaponry. But that is not necessary. When one proposes—as I do—unilateral nuclear disarmament by the United States, one need not propose that we destroy all such devices at one blow. What is necessary is that we *begin* to destroy them, publicly, in full view of invited observers from the Soviet Union and other nations; and that we announce the conditions under which we are going to continue, on a stated schedule, to destroy the rest.

Is it not time for U.S. spokesmen to stop repeating *ad naueam* that every action of the USSR is "Merely Propaganda"? Is such propaganda-of-the-deed as the Soviets have put out "merely propaganda"? If it is that, it is also a quite possible new point of departure in the interplay of the superstates. The United States itself ought now to make such propaganda. For example:

If the plan for "general and complete disarmament," twice now proposed by the USSR, is "merely a bluff," it is not difficult to show up that fact. Begin to meet the initial provisions of their proposal by word and by deed. Begin to cut back the nuclear stockpile. Begin to abandon the overseas bases. Announce the schedule of this cut-back and this abandonment. State the conditions under which it will continue. This need not in any military way be dangerous. Begin to exercise the controls and the inspections the Russians have proposed. Then, *after* the program is under way, raise questions of better inspection and firmer controls by each side of the other.

What is there to lose by such action? The U. S. stockpile, we are told, is now huge enough to slaughter all the people of the world and to devastate all major means of their livelihood. Even in the insane terms of the military metaphysic, there is nothing to be lost by such a line of action. Destroy half the stockpiles, abandon half the bases, and still there would be ample ammunition and ample means of delivery to insure "military safety" in accordance with the weird and ghoulish ideas of safety now prevailing in the higher circles.

How many Americans have actually read the full texts of the Soviet disarmament proposals to the U. N.—for example, the second draft of June 2, 1960? I think I am as aware as anyone can be of the perils and difficulties of *any* such proposal. But I do not understand how any reasonable person who really is against war, who really is against the waste and the peril of the arms race, who really does not fear a genuine peace, can fail to respond to these concrete proposals in some such manner as I have just outlined.

If these and other such proposals are *not* met by the U.S. elite, by the American people, or at least by one of the two political parties, will that not correctly be judged as one more weighty item shifting the balance of blame onto the United States of America? Will not that be one more item for "the Chinese view" within the bloc?

TO PUT the point in this way, to urge that a Soviet proposal be taken seriously and acted upon, even in a tentative way, is to run the risk of being labeled "soft on communism" and all the rest of it. I have reason personally to know that. But must we not ask: If we take such charges seriously, allowing them to inhibit our attempt to think clearly—as they are intended to do—will it be possible to propose *anything* that might break us out of the military metaphysic and the paranoid trap, that might enable men to get off the road that is leading to World War III?

For Americans today, I think the answer is No, it would not be. For that charge is itself part of the stalemate, part of the inhibition maintained by cold warriors among the U. S. elite and various circles of the NATO intellectuals. From the other side, too, the reverse charge of "being soft on America," is part of the stalemate maintained by Stalinist die-hards and other cold warriors of the Soviet bloc.

That is why we should not hesitate to consider why so many Americans have lost even the vision of peace, why there is such an absence of realistic American programs for peace, why U. S. decision-makers are so inert when confronted with proposals by others. And that is why we should, each of us, begin to set forth and to debate, in the most partisan manner open to us, guide lines to peace.

In doing this, should we not remember that the only realistic military view is the view that war, and not Russia, is now the enemy? Should we not keep in mind that the only realistic political view is the view that the cold warrior on either side, not just the Russian, is the enemy?

But don't all such proposals, you say, amount to "appeasement"? Don't they add up to "another Munich"?

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The answer, I believe, is a flat No. This fallacious historical analogy fails to allow for the differences between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia; it leaves out of account much that is new in the world today. For example: Khrushchev is not Hitler, he is not even Stalin; the Soviet elite are more interested in developing their existing society than in expanding its borders by force; nuclear weaponry—the Soviets know well—presents a qualitatively new peril; above all, they believe they can "win" in the competition between the two systems without resort to arms. If we do not want war, *that* is the competition we must face up to—in economic, cultural and political terms.

How 'Modern' Is Republicanism? . . *by Robert G. Spivack*

Washington, D.C.

SEVERAL months before the 1956 election, a group of newsmen were permitted into the President's office to watch some picture-taking of Mr. Eisenhower with a visitor from Australia. This was not the usual practice and why we were allowed to pile into the Executive office has to me always remained a minor mystery. But where one White House reporter goes, all go, and there were about thirty or forty people in the room.

At the rear, almost unnoticed, stood Sherman Adams, the slight, wizened, unsmiling Assistant to the President. Adams was supposed to be such a fierce fellow that most of my colleagues generally kept their distance from him. But I must confess that while I had always found him unresponsive to questions, I had never found him unfriendly. So I walked over and stood with him and noticed that he wore in his lapel a gold pin on which were engraved the letters "CASE." I asked what it meant and he confided that within a few days there would be a formal announcement of a pre-election "Committee of Artists and Scientists for Eisenhower."

"This is to be our egghead group," he said laughing. "I'm still trying to win acceptance by the intellectuals."

Unfortunately for him, he never did. And, I might add parenthetically, it was one of the sad accidents of American politics that Adams who, by the usual political standards was a superior and self-effacing man, should have ended up as he did. He was not a venal politician; maybe he just wanted someone, anyone, even Bernard Goldfine, to like him. In any event, because of Adams the vicuña coat and the oriental rug became symbols of the Republican Party and "CASE" disappeared.

Some day it may be resurrected, if any sizable group of intellectuals decides once again to team up with the Republicans. But this is not likely to happen in 1960 because a transformation of considerable magnitude is taking place within the party. (In some people's judgment, "reversion to type" rather than transformation might seem a more accurate description; but that, I think, would be an oversimplification.)

As recently as the mid-50s, the GOP began to turn, however cautiously, in a new direction. The year 1956 became known as the age of Arthur Larson, who wrote *A Republican Looks at His Party*: such phrases as "modern Republicanism" and "progressive Republicans" came into fashion. Larson's attempts to provide a new philosophical base for the party were acclaimed by the columnists. Even some died-in-the-wool Democratic *literati* went along with the admen who said that the book "reveals the long-term vitality of that [Eisenhower] program . . . and how it has come to represent the best consensus of American opinion and goals."

But that was four years ago. Now Barry Goldwater is the chief literary spokesman of the Republican Party. A feeble attempt was made by the Republican Committee on Program and Progress, headed by Charles H. Percy, to win acceptance for its paperback, *Decisions for a Better America*. But the book attracted nowhere near the attention of Goldwater's *The Conscience of a Conservative*, of which 50,000 copies are now in print. A committee has even been formed to make sure that the Goldwater opus is not ignored by the book reviewers, with whom the rightists are in a continuing state of hostilities. The blurbs tell us that this is a "supremely sensible and eminently courageous book" that will shock orthodox politicians but "gratify millions of Americans who are sick and tired of political contests between meaningless equivocations and undifferentiated distinctions."

The shift from Larson to Goldwater gives some idea of what has happened to the Republican Party. But why did it happen? How deep is Goldwaterism? And what does it portend for the future of the GOP?

BY EVERY axiom of political behavior, the nation should be clamoring for a continuation in power of the Republican Party, the Summit debacle notwithstanding. Granted that we are near the end of the "cult of personality" centered in Eisenhower, the party still would seem to have almost everything working for it. As an entity, it is more homogeneous than the Democratic Party. The "organization man" in San Francisco is not terribly different from the Junior Executive of Englewood, N. J. An Arthur Langlie from the State of Washington (the man who now heads *McCalls*) is not unlike a Henry Cabot Lodge from New England. Those who describe themselves as Republican are largely of native stock, white and Protestant. There is neither a North-South nor an isolationist-internationalist divi-

ROBERT G. SPIVACK is the Washington, D.C., correspondent of the New York Post *and author of a syndicated newspaper column, "Watch on the Potomac."*

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sion. The Eisenhower-Taft wounds have just about healed.

Despite the changing temperatures of the cold war, the steel strike and even the scattered pockets of local depression, the country still enjoys an impressive degree of prosperity. Unless the Soviet Union starts a shooting war, we are likely to remain at peace until after the election.

So two-thirds of the ingredients in that 1956 GOP slogan remain: there is still "peace and prosperity," but there is no "progress."

It will be the job of the hucksters to dispose of this problem in the 1960 campaign. The "image" of Republicanism that they will try to project to the voters is one of a "new, self-made Nixon," of a handsome Bill Rogers protecting civil rights, of a stately gentleman from Kentucky in the person of Thruston Morton shaping the National Committee and of a scholarly Arthur Flemming trying to do something constructive in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Except for dark-faced Dick Nixon, these are handsome, all-American types, and a photo of them with Eisenhower, captioned "my boys," would make attractive campaign literature and maintain the illusion of forward-togetherness.

But that's all it would be, an illusion. The simple fact is that in these closing days of the Eisenhower Administration this group of "young" middle-aged men have been able to accomplish almost nothing, even of the narrow objectives they have set for themselves. Neither in civil rights, medical assistance for the aged, help for the depressed areas, nor in almost any other area of social conflict, have these more-or-less "modern" Republicans been able to make any headway. They have done no more than talk a good fight.

And if they have not been able to accomplish even their limited goals, what chance is there within the Republican ranks for Nelson A. Rockefeller or Jacob K. Javits or Clifford Case, even though they may prove powerful vote-getters in New York or New Jersey? For a liberal, the Republican road is a lonely one.

Why is it that Nixon, supposedly the best-informed, best-prepared

Dickie's Dilemma

Vice President in history, has been able to deliver so little? His apologists claim that all Republicans are thwarted by a Democratic-controlled Congress. The argument does not stand up under examination. The Lyndon Johnson Democrats have given the Administration almost everything for which it really put up a fight. On those few occasions when Democratic liberals forced out more than the Republicans asked, the President used his veto.

The explanation, I believe, for the lack of progress on the home front is that the center of Republican power is not at the White House, as it might have been had there been a determined President, but in Congress. What this means in present-day terms is that Charles Halleck is calling the shots. And that is just another way of saying that the former Secretary of the Treasury, George M. Humphrey, and Standard Oil of Indiana, and others of the Taft school of domestic economics, still exercise the real influence.

Some current historians, notably Jack Bell in his book *The Splendid Misery*, have attempted to pinpoint the moment when Congressional Republicans took control of domestic policy away from the President. Bell goes back to that day in 1952, after the Republican convention, when Robert A. Taft and Eisenhower met at Columbia University to close ranks following the bitter Battle of Chicago. He tells of their "unspoken pact," which was that "Eisenhower could have the White House, Congress would belong to Taft and his assigns." Bell calls it "The Great Surrender." He goes on to say:

> To those who watched the little tableau on that September day, it was apparent that even before his election Eisenhower was mortgaging to the man he had defeated at Chicago an authority that would cramp the full sweep of power any modern President must maintain undiminished if he is to surmount the challenges of a space-age world.

Of course, it was not a space-age world then, and Eisenhower never cared much for the detailed business of politics or government. Furthermore, he believed that if we returned to the simple virtues all problems could be solved. He sensed popular weariness with crises and war and moral laxity in Washington. Everyone simply wanted to have some fun, or to be let alone, and to hell with all things serious. This national mood also was a factor in Eisenhower's behavior. So while the Columbia University meeting does dramatize the opening of the era of the weak Executive, it tells only the beginning of the story of how the Taft-Halleck-Goldwater wing of the party gradually came to dominate party attitudes, or, at least, to paralyze the Nixon-Rogers-Flemming wing. (I deliberately exclude the Hon. Everett McKinley Dirksen, the Senate Republican leader, from philosophical association with either group. He is a man of such flexible convictions that he can be found in almost any camp at any time.)

After Taft's death there was, for a while, a reversal of the conservative trend and there were moments when the President almost seemed to be running things (or was it Jim Hagerty?). Eisenhower simply could not tolerate William F. Knowland, Taft's successor as Republican Senate leader. Also, he was not overly impressed with former Speaker Joe Martin as House leader. The reasons for his reactions were entirely different. Knowland was a blunt-speaking man who held firmly to his convictions, especially when everyone else disagreed with them. His stub-

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bornness caused great dismay at the White House; and when the Senator made his great miscalculation—deciding to run for Governor of California—there were few in the Administration who tried to dissuade him. As for Martin, he simply tired of going through all the political rituals of name-calling and backroom-deals called for by the Administration. Martin and Speaker Sam Rayburn were close friends, and old Joe was not going to impair that friendship in the interest of the boys "downtown" at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

So while Knowland and Martin were around, there was some semblance of backbone at the White House. But mostly it was because the two men irritated the President.

THE man who really tried to make something of the Republican Administration was Herbert Brownell, Jr. Unfortunately, he had soiled his own reputation by his activities in the Harry Dexter White case. What looked like smart politics at the time turned out to be quite the opposite, and Brownell's many real talents were never thereafter shown to full advantage. But he kept trying until a combination of Southerners and Midwest Republicans ganged up on him. The Southerners never forgave him for his part in dispatching troops to Little Rock; the conservative Midwest elements, the hard-core Taftites, never forgave him for the part he had played in winning the Republican nominations for Dewey and Eisenhower.

But other factors also helped drive Brownell into exile. He was, to use C. Wright Mills's phrase, a representative of the "power elite." Those knowledgeable in the ways of politics and high finance knew that Brownell was Wall Street's Ambassador to Washington. His record in protecting A.T.&T., and his handling of anti-trust matters were adequate proof that he did his job well for those special interests. But where some sections of the GOP considered these services as invaluable, elsewhere there lingered the old resentments. The Midwest Republicans still railed against domination by the party's Eastern wing and at every opportunity they hacked away at Brownell until his usefulness was impaired. When he finally returned to his New York law practice, the triumph of the Taftites was virtually complete. There was no one left in the Administration with the determination or the skill to prevent the right wing from setting the pace and the course the party was to take. And, basically, the old right wingers still believe what they have always believed: the New Deal must go.

In his final months as Chief Executive, it also should be recorded that Eisenhower has grown fonder of the company of Halleck and Dirksen than he ever was of Knowland and Martin—or, for that matter, Brownell. All Halleck and Dirksen really ever say is "go slow," an admonition that coincides with the President's instincts. The result has been a veto-happy era in which, as of this writing, the President has turned thumbs down 161 times on even the mild legislation laid before him by a right-of-center Congress.

THUS THE Republicans have come the full cycle, and Nixon presides over a shell of a party which all surveys agree commands the loyalty of scarcely 30 per cent of the electorate. Under the circumstances, does it seem reasonable to believe that, short of an Act of God, Nixon has a chance of becoming President?

The answer is that Nixon and his managers are counting on John F. Kennedy's becoming the Democratic candidate. They are persuaded that Kennedy is an even more divisive public figure than Nixon himself and they are prepared to play up what they consider to be Kennedy's many liabilities: youth, inexperience, Catholicism, spotty voting record, his call for expression of "regrets" to Khrushchev, his alleged domination by certain labor leaders, and the hostility of the nation's Negro spokesmen toward him.

In short, this could still be the kind of campaign on which Nixon thrives—one in which he finds it unnecessary to sell himself because he thinks the public image of his opponent will do the job for him.

This, of course, could be a miscalculation, and there are Nixon Republicans who are realistic enough to know it. Conceding that Kennedy may have many strikes against him, he also has working in his favor the fact that it will be Nixon against the Democratic Party, not just Kennedy. Perhaps the Republicans are whistling in the dark, but Kennedy does not seem to scare them nearly as much as Stevenson. Nothing Kennedy has said, nor for that matter any of the other Democrats, has produced anything approaching the savage reaction to Stevenson's "sledge hammer and crowbar" speech. In politics, "uncontrolled" rage is usually an indication of fear.

THE PROBLEMS posed by Rockefeller's attack on Nixon and the Administration are something else again. In his relatively brief analysis of what is wrong with his party, the New York Governor demolished the house that Dick has so carefully built, indirectly pointing up the fact that Nixon is the prisoner (perhaps a happy captive) of the party's right wing.

Right now to the GOP machine Rockeffeler is a traitor, not one whit better than Harold Stassen. It has reacted in the fashion of monolithic parties the world over. Rockefeller must have anticipated this. He understood that he was representing a minority in a closed corporation. So he took his case to the people. But if Nixon is the nominee and then loses the election, Rockefeller may emerge in a different light. To be able to say "I told you so" will hardly be satisfying to him and completely unsatisfactory to independent liberal voters.

There remains the possibility that the Democrats, too, will put up one of their lesser men. Then the exile of the liberals from both parties will be complete. In that case the Stevenson Democrats and the Rockefeller Republicans may come together. Building a new liberal, progressive party from the ground up could hardly be any more frustrating than trying to save either major party from self-destruction. After all, the Republican Party itself began as a third party, and a century ago they also said it couldn't be done.

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The Noble Panorama of Ideas

THE WESTERN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION: From Leonardo to Hegel. By J. Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish. Harper & Bros. 522 pp. $7.50.

Newton P. Stallknecht

THE PHILOSOPHER A. N. Whitehead, writing of modern education, once deplored the "fatal disconnection of subjects which kills the vitality of our modern curriculum. There is only one subject-matter for education, and that is Life in all of its manifestations." In recent years, a new discipline has emerged whose objective is to temper the rigid departmentalism that Whitehead censured. This, the history of ideas, examines the modes of thought at work in such diverse fields as religion, the sciences, the arts, technology and the law. It is important if it does no more than persuade specialists to treat one another with respect and toleration. It can, if really successful, initiate an "intellectual fusion between the sciences and the humanities." So oriented, we may hope that modern education will increasingly further Whitehead's ideal—the propagation of "that ultimate good sense that we term civilization."

In their new work, Messrs. Bronowski and Mazlish have made a genuine contribution in this direction. They have undertaken to summarize a few important chapters in the history of Western thought. In doing so, they do not let us forget that ideas are human products and owe their existence to the efforts of human individuals. To ignore this is to sacrifice all sense of the concrete. "To read the history of ideas out of its context of men and events is to violate it."

The authors sketch the context of men and events that extends from Leonardo to Hegel—from the discovery of America to the reaction that followed the French Revolution. The practice of earlier works is corrected and due attention is paid to industry and technology. Thus Josiah Wedgwood is recognized as noteworthy along with Machiavelli and Pascal. No field is slighted, although the importance of the natural sciences is heavily emphasized. Herbert Butterfield is quoted with approval when he says of the scientific revolution that it "outshines everything since the rise of Christianity and reduces the Renaissance and Reformation to the rank of mere episodes." The authors recognize that this revolution implies a basic change in the way that people picture the world—"from a world of things ordered according to their ideal nature, to a world of events running in a steady mechanism of before and after."

Unfortunately, the philosophical limitations of this point of view are nowhere in the volume thoroughly examined. For instance, the treatment of Kant's critical philosophy is sketchy and there is no reference to his later thought as developed in the *Critique of Judgment*, where the presiding ideas of modern idealistic philosophy are formulated. This work deserves at least as much attention as that bestowed upon Hegel, whose absolutism is a far less healthy and a no more typical or inevitable outgrowth of German philosophy. In other words, philosophical idealism is not allowed to put its best foot forward. In this single respect, the work of Bronowski and Mazlish is narrowly conceived and the reader would do well to supplement their argument by turning to other authors.

NONE the less, the panorama of men and ideas which this volume opens to the reader is a noble one and the interpretation of the modern period of Western thought is important. The most interesting and perhaps the most characteristic contribution is the detailed treatment of the industrial revolution, including incidentally its brilliant offspring, the "Lunar Society" of Birmingham, whose widespread influence extended across the Atlantic via Franklin, Jefferson and Tom Paine. That brilliant group of manufacturers and scientists—among them Wedgwood, Arkwright, James Watt, Priestley, Erasmus Darwin and the Galtons—left its mark on every phase of British culture: industrial, scientific, literary and religious. Not the least of their manifold achievements was a simplification of English prose, inspired by the policy of the Royal Society, and indirectly, perhaps, an influence on English verse. This influence set them in spectacular contrast to the later Edmund Burke, whose reactionary and increasingly extravagant rhetoric, as he denounced the philosophy of the French Revolution, summarized the growing opposition to the enlightenment for which the Lunar Society had stood.

The book then moves into a remarkable and fascinating account of reactionary philosophy. We are shown in some detail how Burke and Hegel repudiated the generous ideas that had characterized the enlightenment, how the eighteenth-century virtues of common sense, enlightened self-interest and cosmopolitanism yield to an almost mystical sense of national destiny as it is said to be manifest in history. According to Hegel:

> History is always of great importance for a people; since by means of that it becomes conscious of the path of development taken by its own spirit, which expresses itself in laws, manners, customs, and deeds. History presents a people with their own image in a condition which thereby becomes objective to them (p. 486).

Our own century is only too well acquainted with the outcome of this way of thought. The manifest-destiny interpretation of history has marred the reasonableness of modern life and introduced a serious confusion between fact and value. Like the *Deus vult!* of the Crusaders, it undermines deliberation; and when it takes the form *Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht* it sinks almost to the level of David Harum's "Him who has gits," or "Nothing succeeds like success." Such inverted historicism is a distortion of true modernism which is essentially, if paradoxically, a tradition of dissent, always ready to challenge and to re-evaluate traditional authority. This rational anti-traditionalism is supported by assumptions characteristic of the modern age:

> In the 500 years since Leonardo, two ideas about man have been especially important. The first is the emphasis on the full development of the human personality. The individual is prized for himself. His creative powers are seen as the core of his being. . . . The second of the two grand formative ideas which this history displays is the idea of freedom. We see in fact that human fulfillment is unattainable without freedom, so that these two main

NEWTON P. STALLKNECHT is the author of Strange Seas of Thought (*Indiana*), *a study of Wordsworth's philosophy. He is professor of philosophy at Indiana University.*

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ideas are linked together. There could be no development of the personality of individuals, no fulfillment of those gifts in which one man differs from another, without the freedom for each man to grow in his own direction (p. 500).

Bronowski and Mazlish are right to point out that these "grand formative ideas" are at the base of our civilization. One might comment, however, that, although essentially modern, these ideas were not created *ex nihilo* at the beginning of our era. Their roots lie deep in earlier thought, for example in the New Testament, in Aristotle's ethics and in Greek tragedy. After all, the Western intellectual tradition extends not merely from Leonardo to Hegel but, let us say, from Homer to Heidegger. As Wallace Stevens has put it:

Adam
In Eden was the father of Descartes.

Bronowski and Mazlish know this well enough, but they do not always take due care to emphasize it. They have made clear to the general reader that study of the Western intellectual tradition is a fascinating and important undertaking. We need add only that the tradition should be considered as a whole.

De Gaulle in His Own Image

THE EDGE OF THE SWORD. By Charles de Gaulle. (Translated by Gerard Hopkins). Criterion Books. 128 pp. $3.50.

THE WAR MEMOIRS OF CHARLES DE GAULLE: Vol. III: Salvation, 1944-1946. (Translated by Richard Howard). Simon & Schuster. 346 pp. $6.

William G. Andrews

DURING President de Gaulle's recent visit to New Orleans, Louisiana's shatterpated Governor grabbed the haughty statesman by the lapels before a large audience and recited Grantland Rice's lines:

When the Great Scorer comes to
write the score against his name,
He won't write how he won or lost
but how he played the game.

In this madcap scene, pea-pickin' Earl Long articulated the underlying theme of de Gaulle's two books, whose publication coincided with his visit. Both concern how de Gaulle played in the two great games he has lost.

The Edge of the Sword, written in 1932, presents the views he held on military philosophy, psychology and doctrine at the time when he was campaigning unsuccessfully to persuade his superiors to modernize the French army. But it is of much wider interest today, for in many respects it provides clearer insight into de Gaulle's personality and better elucidates the underlying reasons for his comportment than any of his other writings. The code of behavior for the man of action it sets forth is the mold into which he has poured his own public personality. If the measure of a man is the extent to which he masters himself, de Gaulle must be ranked among the great. One may question some of his ideals, but cannot deny that he is their incarnation. What writer on French politics has better explained de Gaulle's return to power in 1958 than this twenty-eight-year-old passage?

> By satisfying the secret desires of men's hearts, by providing compensation for the cramped conditions of their lives, he will capture their imagination, and, even should he fall by the way, will retain, in their eyes, the prestige of those heights to which he did his best to lead them.

Who better fits this model of a great leader than its author?

> Aloofness, character, and the personification of greatness, these qualities it is that surround with prestige those who are prepared to carry a burden which is too heavy for lesser mortals. . . . The degree of suffering . . . is . . . no less tormenting than the hair shirt of the penitent. This helps to explain those cases of withdrawal which, otherwise, are so hard to understand.

He commended then and exemplified later "calmness and alertness," pragmatism, opportunism, resourcefulness and audacity. His "great leader" was to have lofty aims and ideals, an air of mystery, vision, a sense of grandeur, a contempt for detail and "egotism, pride, hardness, and cunning." The reader is startled again and again to see de Gaulle describing his future self and explaining why the ideal leader must be what de Gaulle later was. "'Arrogant and undisciplined' is what the mediocrities say of him, treating the thoroughbred with a tender mouth as they would a donkey which refuses to move."

De Gaulle's prophetic introspection in *The Edge of the Sword* is superbly complemented in *Salvation* by reflective contemplation on his other lost battle, to remold France in 1944-45. In the first is his vision of the great leader; in the elegant prose of the second we see the "absurd anomaly" of such a leader failing to guide "the Madonna in the frescoes" to her "exalted and exceptional destiny" because of "the faults of Frenchmen."

Salvation opens with the triumph of the Liberation and with "de Gaulle [the author refers to himself in the third person], that almost legendary character who incarnated this prodigious liberation in all eyes," "establishing the government" and "enabling the country to resume its life and its labor." It ends with de Gaulle's 1946 resignation causing "the mass of the French people" to sink "back into distress." In between are de Gaulle's efforts to introduce certain social and economic reforms, restore France to her rightful place among the Great Powers, hang on to Syria, Lebanon, Indochina and North Africa in the face of the evil intentions of both

WILLIAM G. ANDREWS, author of Pierre Mendès-France: A Study of Political Ideas in Action, *teaches Government at Dartmouth College.*


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Allies and natives, and contribute to winning the war insofar as this would conduce to the French national interest. He also matches intransigence with Stalin to the latter's alleged disadvantage and with the parties and the politicians, the dissemblers and factions, to his own disadvantage. He struggles with the Consultative and Constituent assemblies, purges occupation collaborators, bickers with General Eisenhower and with France's Allies in the conferences to which they were gracious enough to invite him.

It is difficult to sympathize with his firm belief that the needs of the joint Allied war effort at a crucial juncture in the Battle of the Bulge should have been sacrificed to French prestige. Nor is one convinced that all French political leaders who disagreed with de Gaulle were driven by evil and selfish motives. *Salvation* is most interesting and valuable where its author discusses the evolving political situation, presenting his views on politicians, parties, government, leadership and the state candidly, cogently and fully.

AT the moment of his greatest triumph—the liberation of France—the tragic defect in his ideal begins to appear. When he wrote in 1932 that the great leader "must personify contempt for contingencies, and leave it to his subordinates to be bogged down in detail," he was underlining his own inability to comprehend the problems posed by clashes that are not "on the grand scale" but are nevertheless of tremendous importance in the life of the modern state. Thirteen years later, when he closed a crucial discussion with René Pleven and Pierre Mendès-France by commenting, "You won't get me discussing economics and finances for a whole afternoon again," he showed the grave implications of that attitude. Through his disdain for such "details," he was led to favor a policy of weakness and folly that laid the base for much of France's subsequent economic difficulties. His defense in *Salvation* of that decision is unconvincing but revealing.

When de Gaulle speaks in general terms he sees his function as the supreme arbitrator, reconciling antagonistic factions to the national interest. As one examines specific incidents a different picture emerges. His political influence, as he describes it, is less arbitral than catalytic. Each time he addressed the Consultative Assembly "there occurred among the members a fusing of minds . . . the human contact with de Gaulle himself reminded the delegates of the solidarity which linked us all together." On his entry into Paris in 1944 the crowds were "exalted by this presence." He was disappointed when his proposal for European unity did not at once crystallize opinion and surge forward without further effort on his part. He foresaw his task in the French recovery effort as being "to galvanize" the "enormous enterprises . . . vigorous action" and "strong institutions." And when he resigned, "that atmosphere of exaltation, that hope of success, that ambition for France, which supported the national soul" was thereby dissipated.

When de Gaulle returned to power in 1958 his presence again had a galvanic effect but his reluctance to engage in the hurly-burly of political in-fighting except where the problem is clearly and heroically posed, as in Algiers last January, has caused French domestic politics to slide a long way back toward the grimy morass of *immobilisme* that so typified the Fourth Republic. Grantland Rice, Earl Long and Major de Gaulle to the contrary notwithstanding, it is not true that "all leaders of men . . . are . . . remembered less for the usefulness of what they achieved than for the sweep of their endeavors."

Why Do We Work?

WORK AND EDUCATION: The Role of Technical Culture in Some Distinctive Theories of Humanism. By John W. Donohue, S. J. Loyola University Press. 238 pp. $4.

Ronald Gross

IN OUR currently fashionable concern over the "problem" of leisure, we frequently forget the enormous unresolved contradictions and confusions which remain in our ideas about the work that makes leisure possible. C. Wright Mills has pointed out that we still lack a widely accepted ideology of work, and we are just beginning to fumble toward some coherent notion of leisure. Consequently we set aside parcels of time labeled "work" and "leisure" in such a mechanical and conventional way that we lose the capacity to enjoy either one in full measure.

In *Work and Education*, Father Donohue performs an invaluable service by inspecting the half-forgotten philosophical sources of our unexamined assumptions about the place of work in individual and social life. Three major positions emerge: Marx's apotheosis of work as the primal and ultimate human activity; Dewey's belief in the unique efficacy of work for developing the only sound method of thinking and acting cooperatively; and Babbitt's allegiance to the Aristotlean principle, central to Western humanism, which sees work as simply the necessary cost of contemplative leisure.

For Marx, labor is the unique activity by which men first distinguished themselves from the animals by producing their own means of subsistence. The ultimately decisive element throughout history has always been man's particular mode of productive activity in each era. And Marx has an unequivocal answer to the query about what we will do in that utopia which will end history: we will work. But the abolition of class exploitation will make work so intrinsically enjoyable that we'll forego our demands for equal rewards for equal work, and remuneration can be on the basis of need alone. In this image of the human drama, work is the index of distinctly human life, its ubiquitous determinant and its utopian finale.

Opposite Marx, Father Donohue places the upholders of the Hellenic tradition of work as the servant of leisure. He selects Irving Babbitt, Robert Hutchins and Mortimer Adler to represent this position, which has dominated humanistic speculation about work, and which locates man's unique and noblest fulfillment in contemplation independent of the material or social world.

Dewey, falling between these two extremes, believed that "there is no such thing as genuine knowledge and fruitful understanding except as the offspring of *doing*." In their work, Dewey maintained, men first discovered and continually relearn the only method of sound thinking and living — scientific, instrumental, problem-solving pragmatism.

FATHER DONOHUE'S artfully constructed analysis can be viewed as essentially a series of variations on two underlying themes. On the one hand, work can be considered an instrument to something beyond itself, and valued by society for the goods it produces, or by the individual for what its wages will buy. On the other, work can be exalted for its own sake, either because it

RONALD GROSS is Assistant to the Executive Director of the Education Division of the Ford Foundation.

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expresses a fundamentally demiurgic human nature, or because it is the primary arena for developing men's faculties and social communion. These two themes reveal some surprising parallels between the classic formulations presented by Father Donohue, and contemporary viewpoints.

Sharing the instrumental view of work, David Riesman, for example, rejects as impractical the attempts to introduce "joy and meaning" into modern factory and office work, and argues that we must push for further mechanization in order to gain time for the fullest pleasures of consumption. The intrinsic value of work is also minimized by those economists concerned with problems of "manpower": Eli Ginzberg, Director of Columbia University's Conservation of Human Resources Project, debunks the whole theory of alienation from work elaborated by Marx, Ruskin and Durkheim. He insists that the modern factory worker is as aware as was the eighteenth-century craftsman that he is being paid for doing something useful, and he points to the satisfactions the worker gets from being able to maintain his family at a high level of consumption without having to work as hard as his father did.

Contemporary commentators also echo the classical themes on the other side, in exhortations to make work humanly satisfying in itself. Riesman again, characteristically playing both sides of the sociological street, bemoans the silent revolt against work on all levels of our social life. Less equivocally, such diverse spokesmen as Harvey Swados, Daniel Bell and Paul Goodman attribute our distinctive social malaise to the vacuity and corruption of work in a profit-driven economy.

Work and Education lucidly presents the background of conflicting ideals against which any re-examination of work must take place. Can we look for a possible resolution to this conflict, independent of the theological framework which inspires Father Donohue's Christian synthesis? The proper use of this kind of speculative dialogue is not to formulate a perfect verbal definition of work. Rather, it is to give us coherent images of possible ways to improve our actual working conditions. The philosopher who discusses work as if it were a monolithic social entity tends to conceal rather than illuminate the facts. We must look toward a resolution, not in terms of Man the Worker, but in terms of particular men doing particular jobs that are clean or dirty, gratifying or frustrating. The real policy question is not work as means *or* end, but what kinds of means and ends our work shall embody. We will better justify work as a means, to the extent that we create jobs with clear and socially useful purposes. Work will become a reasonable end in itself to the degree that we provide more jobs evoking intensive commitment by whole human beings, and stop wasting our ingenuity devising ways to adjust the worker to his intrinsically meaningless task by bathing him in mechanized music and providing group therapy to improve his motivation. "Great is work," says the *Talmud*, "for it honors the workman."

Germany and the West

THE MIND OF GERMANY. By Hans Kohn. Charles Scribner's Sons. 370 pp. $5.95.

George L. Mosse

IS THERE a German mind? Professor Kohn certainly thinks so and he states his thesis succinctly and with learning. The German mind was formed by the "war against the West," a war waged by German intellectuals and supported by Prussia's ideal of power and her militarism. The war began with the Napoleonic occupation and the turn which romanticism took in Germany. The scene is set for a Germany imbued with its own special mission, with a belief in national unity centered in the *Volk*, and given direction by a hatred of France. To be sure, there were liberals in Germany, but their liberalism withered when Prussia crushed the revolutions of 1848 in south Germany. Finally, when Bismarck triumphed over Austria, liberals rushed into the waiting arms of the Iron Chancellor. All of this formed the German mind until, in the 1920s, some German nihilists like Ernst Juenger seceded not only from the West but from civilization itself.

However, there is a happy ending. The Federal Republic seems to him to have broken with this German mind. Its orientation comes from the Rhineland and south Germany, which all along

GEORGE L. MOSSE, Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin, is the author of The Struggle for Sovereignty in England *and* The Holy Pretence, A Study in Christianity and Reason of State.

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might have given rise to better things if Prussia had not triumphed. Now Prussia is no more—or rather is in the Communist East. It is necessary to state Professor Kohn's thesis in this summary fashion in order to realize the problems which it raises. What is this West from which the German mind seceded? Professor Kohn takes a definite stand in his first chapter, on Goethe. The sage of Weimar is the very opposite of the developing German mind, and a true representative of the West. Goethe typifies the rationalism, cosmopolitanism and tolerant moderation which sharply contrasted with German romanticism, "myth making" and worship of power for its own sake. But is the West really like that—an elongated shadow of Goethe? Professor Kohn points to the absence of aggressiveness in the West in contrast to German expansionism. Yet the West was aggressive; not in Europe, perhaps, but in the colonial world. Romanticism and racism did not obtain the same hold within the Western nations that they did in Germany, yet these ideas were applied by imperialistic nations to their empires. It is true that neo-romanticism in the intensity of its emotional appeal divided Germany from the West, largely because it became a "race mysticism." It is astonishing that there is so little about race in this book and so much about the Prussian idea of power.

THAT IDEA of power is defined as a complete assimilation of Machiavellianism. While it is refreshing to see Bismarck treated for once not as a hero but as a villain, the concept of power which dominated his actions was by no means uniquely German. As far back as the seventeenth century Machiavellianism had been assimilated as a concept of power not only in central Europe, but especially in England and France.

The greatest difficulty with Professor Kohn's definition of the German mind is that a most important part of it is omitted. For, was Karl Marx not an expression of the German mind? Marxism does not, of course, fit in with the thesis of a war against the West, for the West itself provided a congenial home for these ideas. Nor does Marxism provide proof that the forces of southern Germany and the Rhineland might, if given a chance, have linked Germany with the West, as Kohn believes they are now doing through the Rhinelander Konrad Adenauer. Marx was a Rhinelander too, and the Social Democrats who evolved and developed his ideas were more consistently Western according to Kohn's definition than any other segment of German thought. They were the true opposition to what he calls the "German mind" and it seems odd to omit them from it; though their inclusion would have made men like Adenauer less than unique in their Western orientation. The Social Democrats failed in 1933 precisely because of their liberalism and moderation, their devotion to representative government at all costs.

Is there no relationship between an ideal and its historical milieu? Professor Kohn never asks whether the ethos of Goethe would have worked in the concrete historical and economic situation of Germany. He points to the success of the Third Republic in France and to the failure of the German Republic as something intrinsic to the development of German nationalism. But this is surely only one of many factors. There was no great depression in 1870, and six million unemployed might have put a great strain on French rationalism, as a much less serious social dislocation did in the Dreyfus affair.

While the book is concerned with the education of the nation by intellectuals, such factors as the slow industrialization of Germany are still important. What is called German "pessimism" can also be seen as a nostalgia for the old days by classes, like the artisans, which were being squeezed out by industrial progress. To say that "German intellectuals succeeded in leading the German people into the abyss" is to put a great premium on the process of myth-making at the expense of the reality of history. This is not to absolve the intellectuals from guilt—but would they have been effective if they had proclaimed a religion of humanity? Like Benedetto Croce in Fascist Italy, they would have been noble but isolated. As it was, they did propagate a neo-romanticism and a racism which led to catastrophe, though in this book nothing is said about National Socialism itself. In order to make this movement understandable, more would have to be said about race and less about Prussian power. National Socialism was, after all, an Austrian and south German movement.

THESE are some of the problems raised by Professor Kohn's thesis. They make it not a less but a more important book than if it had no strongly expressed opinions. If he had written a history of German nationalism and not an inquiry into the German mind as a whole, there would have been less dissent. Similarly, if the West had not been idealized in the name of Liberalism and the Enlightenment, Germany's separation from Western thought would have been more convincing. The conclusions about West German democracy spring out of this characterization of the West. It is based on the hypothesis that Germany's alliance with the West is the decisive factor in the final demise of the German mind. Liberalism, moderation and concern for humanity will in this way triumph in Germany. Regardless of whether or not the West stands for these ideologies, it is doubtful that a political and military alliance must needs have such consequences. Enough has been written of late about problems of neo-Nazism and nationalism in the Federal Republic to render any optimism about its future development questionable. Moreover, Professor Kohn has to ignore East Germany, which if united with the Western section, would certainly undo the alliance with the Western nations.

The definition of the West as an ideological unity can have serious consequences in reviving the holy war against the East. Germany's Foreign Minister has already taken advantage of this as he celebrated in 1955 the thousand-year anniversary of the victory of the Emperor over the East at the battle of Lechfeld. Has the German war against the West ended only to enlist the West in a new and greater struggle?

Professor Kohn would reject this interpretation of recent German developments, and he may well be right. But his analysis does lead to such speculations.

Polyglot Reader

THE POEM ITSELF. Edited by Stanley Burnshaw. Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 338 pp. $6.50.

Ramon Guthrie

THE PREMISE on which *The Poem Itself* is based is that poetry cannot be translated or even that, as Valéry says, "Any writing that has an aim that can be expressed by another writing is prose."

Under the editorship of Stanley Burnshaw, twenty-three scholars, with a good smattering of poets among them, have produced a polyglot anthology of selections from the works of forty-five poets writing in six languages, and endeavored to make them accessible, as poetry, to the English-speaking reader who may have no knowledge of the original tongues. Their purpose is to convey the feeling

RAMON GUTHRIE, poet and critic, teaches comparative literature at Dartmouth. His latest collection of verse, Graffiti, *was published by Macmillan.*

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and effectiveness of the poem, as well as its meaning, by comment, interpretation and paraphrase, rather than by translation.

Among the poets included in the anthology are Baudelaire, Mallarmé, Rilke, Brecht, Leopardi, Lorca, Quasimodo and Ungaretti.

Since sound is an important element of poetry, *The Poem Itself* contains notes on the prosody and pronunciation of each of the languages represented, and the reader is warned that the profit he may get from the work will be proportionate to the "effort he is willing to invest in learning to hear."

In addition to being a book that everyone concerned with poetry should own, *The Poem Itself* is an interesting experiment that may well become a pioneer of its kind. The chief flaw in its method is that the reader is asked to read the original poem "along with" the English paraphrase — which would require more eyes and minds than most of us are equipped with. As Mr. Burnshaw admits, "Ideally each poem should be available in a recording."

The success of the method depends much on the kind of poems selected and the skill and perception of the explicator. Thanks to clear comment by John F. Nims, who has a happy knack of exploring poetry without dispelling its essential mystery, the reader with no knowledge of Gallego (the dialect of Galicia) can experience the poems of Rosalía Castro without too much difficulty. And one need not know the popular vernacular of Rome to enjoy the rollicking cynicism of a Belli sonnet as Professor Bergin presents it. Similarly, the shorter poems of Rilke and Brecht come through as aesthetic experience to the reader who has only sketchy German, but this reader at least could achieve no more than an intellectual comprehension of the long excerpt from Rilke's "Die Erste Elegie."

Occasionally the commentaries obscure more than they elucidate. The translation of Valéry's beautiful evocation of the sound of the cicada in summer air: "L'insecte ne gratte la sécheresse," as "The sharp insect scrapes at the dryness of the earth," is a case in point.

ART

Fairfield Porter

PHOTOGRAPHY in the Fine Arts, the second in a continuing series of exhibitions at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, is based on a fallacy. It is fallacious to think that the question, is photography an art?, can be decided by much the same process that elects Representatives-at-Large to Congress. A number of photographic organizations, both professional and amateur, and organizations of publishers and advertisers, nominated 800 photographs by nearly as many photographers, and from these a final selection was made by a jury of twelve: curators, museum directors, art critics and photographers, who voted quite secretly and without regard to any consideration but their own preferences. The jury elected 127 black-and-white photographs and 49 color photographs, which can be seen at the museum until September 4th. One objection to this procedure is that the works were first of all screened by organizations—an organization has no taste—and another objection is that democratic choice is irrelevant to artistic standards.

Photography is an art if the photographer loves it enough, and if the juror who selects the show responds. James Rorimer, director of the museum, says, "In our era, when art enthusiasts are welcoming paintings of white on black and black on white, even white on white, the photographer should have his day in court." But photographers are not suing anyone, and they need no defense. When was black-and-whiteness the essential nature only of the photographic medium? And where does color fit in?

Photography is a medium—you can recognize a photograph—but attempts to define it, to limit what it is, will always come up against important exceptions. Is photography a kind of ultimate realism, as is implied by the pejorative adjective "photographic"? What then about abstract photographs? Very often a diagram, or diagrammatic drawing, can be more informative than a photograph, as in an atlas of anatomy. One wonders whether a photograph is art, not so much because of anything inherent in the medium, as because the difference between art and craft, and art or craft and mechanism, is very subtle in photography. This subtlety has mostly eluded the screening organizations and the jurors; so if this rather disappointing exhibition proves anything about the artistic nature of photography, it is that among the thousands of photographs taken every year, very few are art. Which is not to be wondered at, for it is also true of painting, sculpture, literature, music and all the arts. The exhibition proves that art is not what people look for first of all in photography, which has so many uses, like recording and advertising. And it is hard to tell immediately when a photograph stands out as art.

THE color photograph that stood out for me was Horst's *Two Moslem Women.* Nothing escapes from the picture, every cool color is where it should be (as good color also should be in painting). Photography enjoys the advantage of having hardly any problem about muddiness, since its color is an aspect of light. Pleasing color photographs are Kauffman's *Punting on the Cherwell* and Haas's *Norwegian Fjord,* which depends perhaps too much on being a record of a landscape extraordinarily beautiful in nature.

In black and white a standard for me is whether the photographer, either in

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the dark room, or at the shutter (like Cartier-Bresson, who leaves developing and printing to anyone else), can maintain a life for values and textures all over the picture. Matisse told the pupils in his painting class to make every corner alive; and this seems to have been supremely the practice of the photographer Atget. Among the black and whites that I liked are Cornell Capa's photograph of Pasternak sitting on a park bench among a litter of leaves against a background of young birches, which has that multiplicity of nature found in Pasternak's verbal descriptions; Breitenbach's *War Orphan, Korea*, with all its grays alive; Carolyn Mason Jones's *Bridge through the Window*, with the sun shining through raindrops on the glass; the dispersed and ragged abstract pattern of Lessing's *Hungarian Revolution*; Cartier-Bresson's *Matisse and Doves* — he is a photographer who is able to suggest in any subject, a political, editorial point of view; and Porter's *Sick Herring Gull*, whose intensely accurate textures to the very edge of the picture, make other photographs look journalistic.

The exhibition does not convince me that the organizations which submitted photographs to the jury are primarily interested in the art of photography. I would like to see work by Ellen Auerbach, Rudolph Burckhardt, Robert Frank, George Montgomery and Walter Silver.

FILMS

Robert Hatch

INGMAR BERGMAN's *Dreams* belongs to his pre-*Seventh Seal* period, before allegory and legend had assumed a large place in his narrative imagination. It is, for him, a quiet and uncomplicated work with the ingratiating quality of seeming to be improvised from a sketchy outline.

The story impulse of *Dreams* is not very strong; it is more a film about a subject. In general, I suspect extrapolation from one art form to another, but I kept seeing this picture as a theme with variations. The theme is love and the variations involve one combination of two women and a man and another of two men and a woman. Six people are involved, of which two find happiness and four retreat with their hearts cut and their claws bloody. The young taste joy, the old — or older — give and take wounds which, less than mortal, are still incurable. But I do not think that Bergman is saying anything so melancholy, or so untrue, as that only the young are capable of love. What he does say is that only the young can afford to treat love as a game. Later, we hazard too much when we play at it.

The cast of *Dreams* includes several players now recognized as members of Bergman's "company" — Harriet Andersson, Eva Dahlbeck, Gunnar Björnstrand and others. They perform with the lovely emotional immediacy that he elicits from his actors. I felt at times that they were turning themselves on and off with disconcerting abruptness, but I will not make too much of that for it is no doubt a consequence of the improvisation I like. It is also probable that Bergman keyed his performers to the clipped, pose and break, professionalism of fashion photography, which is the principal milieu of this film. That sort of wit appeals to his honed mind.

I HAVE finally caught up with *Pull My Daisy*, which turns out to be a beat "Our Gang" comedy. Larry Rivers, unaccountably playing a railroad brakeman, invites Allen Ginsberg, Gregory Corso and a couple of like-minded friends over to the pad to help entertain a square Zen bishop, his mother and sister, new and valued acquaintances of the brakeman's wife.

The poets, being good kids, try to make the evening go by being real polite and interested, but they don't understand bishop talk and the beer and wine sort of scramble things up. So the Zenster and his ladies leave pretty early, which upsets the wife, and the boys all pour down the stairs for more fun somewhere up the block.

It lasts only twenty-five minutes and for that length of time it is dandy. Partly that is because Jack Kerouac, who put the things together and who narrates it, kids his own crowd as happily as he does the outside squares; partly it is because Ginsberg and Corso are fine clowns — their air of absurdity trying to be convincing is one of the roots of good slapstick. From time to time, Kerouac's text (interpolations by Ginsberg) "takes off," and then it sounds like an attempt to set poetry to film. But when he talks the beat mumble he is funny, and he has a gift for voice impersonation that keeps the pseudo-dialogue bright and lively.

I have a feeling that the boys may really make it in the movies (not that they have done badly in the paperback and lecture business); they are what we have been needing since Hal Roach left us.

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Crossword Puzzle No. 872

By FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS:

1 Bracelets might be, as they used to be to meet one. (7)
5 More like the way Father William's bones were. (7)
9 Declared the mean time gone Communist. (7)
10 Fancy bun. (7)
11 Not necessarily from the Black Forest. (5)
12 and 17 down Despicable fellow, not many being associated with the ring. (6)
13 Token connection between the cart and the horse? (5)
14 Tea might be moved fast around where the ball is held. (7)
16 Doesn't make an agreeable comment. (7)
18 Can be made, as it can turn bad. (7)
21 and 27 across The structure of many languages. (5, 2, 5)
28 The sort of vigil Pope's pensive poets keep. (7)
29 Learned (the hard way, for some). (7)
31 Portraying the spirits of Reformed Churchmen? (7)

DOWN:

2 How to give the wrong name to a single flower? (7)
3 and 30 Robin time, according to legend. (5, 7)
4 Came to a conclusion. (7)
5 Made certain of what might sprout around 12. (7)
7 Row a long time in the race. (7)
8 Twelve and 17 might be one of these, sometimes made with cast iron. (7)
15 and 26 The province of humor with a smart thrust. (6)
18 and 1 down On the track of those who engrave the holder of 8? (14)
19 and 6 Would it make a wild pinto pivot? (7, 5)
20 Got round (but flatter in the past).
21 The small flap permits surfaces to be written on. (7)
22 Completed in the reconstruction period by I. Butler. (7)
23 and 24 Ruth's all free of the grease remover you upset! (7, 5)
25 Does this official merely get off with an incredulous expression about it? (5)
27 More discouraged, or rather more like a jazz tune? (5)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 871

ACROSS: 1 Holding the bag; 10 Chasm; 11 Weathered; 13 Spoke; 14 Corn plasters; 19 Crosspatches; 22 Ester; 24 Plaything; 25 Garibaldi; 26 Canon; 27 Fringe benefit. DOWN: 2 Orally; 3 Dominions; 4 New Guinea; 5 Trail; 6 Ethos; 7 Air power; 8 Scabs; 9 Adverse; 15 Lucrative; 16 Spectacle; 17 Acreage; 18 Torturer; 20 Rienzi; 21 Aging; 23 Robin; 24 Pulse.

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The Odd-Ball Idea



According to *Newsweek* of Feb. 29, 1960, Roger Revelle, Director of the Scripps Institution of Oceanology, offered a UCLA class this solution to the problem of war: "If we send a million young Americans to be educated in Russia and they send a million here, there would be no chance of war. They would, in effect, be hostages."

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